Not looking to troll, but none of the spoofed signatures contain iPhone-related names. That's not to say they weren't there, but I wonder about the coincidence.
For instance, the ability to know the GPC locations of victims - this data is not easy to obtain, unless a device is laced with malware through a malicious app. I think it's also universally accepted (and has been reported many times) that Google's Play store doesn't;t have the same levels of malware protection
So malware-laced apps downloaded from the Play store create a profile on their users, which then are matched against bank data that has already been obtained elsewhere to complete the metadata signature that's then utilised in the attack to bypass bank's protections and 2FAs?
Another reason to pay for everything using credit cards, rather than direct debits which are so popular in the UK.
What happens to the people's accounts in cases like this? Knowing capitalism and banks, I'm guessing the consumer is yet again expected to bootstrap themselves out of losing their life savings, I assume.
Dear FBI. This is why we need strong encryption for everyone. With strong encryption and actual (non SMS) 2FA, this type of attack is mitigated.
What happens to the people's accounts in cases like this? Knowing capitalism and banks, I'm guessing the consumer is yet again expected to bootstrap themselves out of losing their life savings, I assume.
Not looking to troll, but none of the spoofed signatures contain iPhone-related names. That's not to say they weren't there, but I wonder about the coincidence.
For instance, the ability to know the GPC locations of victims - this data is not easy to obtain, unless a device is laced with malware through a malicious app. I think it's also universally accepted (and has been reported many times) that Google's Play store doesn't;t have the same levels of malware protection
So malware-laced apps downloaded from the Play store create a profile on their users, which then are matched against bank data that has already been obtained elsewhere to complete the metadata signature that's then utilised in the attack to bypass bank's protections and 2FAs?
Another reason to pay for everything using credit cards, rather than direct debits which are so popular in the UK.
Perhaps also enterprising individuals combined multiple darknet credential and financial data dumps into a whole and went to town.
About the credit versus debit card ... My debit card is safer than my credit card. Any interaction that does not involve chip+pin requires TFA where I need to enter a transaction code generated by a TAN generator. And if a seller escalates to lower safety (chip + signature), the joke is on them in terms of fraud liability.
What happens to the people's accounts in cases like this? Knowing capitalism and banks, I'm guessing the consumer is yet again expected to bootstrap themselves out of losing their life savings, I assume.
It's more than a touch a depressing how financial institutions of all places seem to lag so badly on basic authentication practices. Banks were the last major service I used to have awful password practices (short max sizes, regular rotation required, weird arbitrary character restrictions, etc). Whereas with other services I can require use of hardware tokens (which has been possible for a long time, but is now vastly easier thanks to webauthn), support from banks is non-existent.It would be nice if banks provided multi factor authentication through a medium other than SMS, but few financial institutions do.
This.It would be nice if banks provided multi factor authentication through a medium other than SMS, but few financial institutions do.
More robust security is of course nice, but it certainly sounds like they accessed those SMS messages on the device itself; i.e. the insecurity was due to the devices and how they deal with SMS, not the protocol itself (which is what people usually complain about when they complain about SMS insecurity). It's conceivable that app permissions could be improved here to reduce this risk, e.g. by forbidding permanent access to incoming SMS messages (or at least treating that very differently), and typically requiring each app to request permission each time it wants to read an incoming SMS. Other 2fa implementations can also have vulnerabilities once your device is hacked, even if they use more secure protocols.[The attackers were also able to bypass multi-factor authentication by accessing SMS messages.]
How many times does this have to happen for multi-factor authentication to no longer use SMS?
Debit is inherently less safe than credit card though. When you get hit with a few thousand $$$$ in fraud on your bank account, it seems to take weeks or more to get investigated and reversed. It takes 1 short phone call to my credit card company to dispute the charge and get it locked down, during which time I still have the money in my bank account and remaining available credit.Not looking to troll, but none of the spoofed signatures contain iPhone-related names. That's not to say they weren't there, but I wonder about the coincidence.
For instance, the ability to know the GPC locations of victims - this data is not easy to obtain, unless a device is laced with malware through a malicious app. I think it's also universally accepted (and has been reported many times) that Google's Play store doesn't;t have the same levels of malware protection
So malware-laced apps downloaded from the Play store create a profile on their users, which then are matched against bank data that has already been obtained elsewhere to complete the metadata signature that's then utilised in the attack to bypass bank's protections and 2FAs?
Another reason to pay for everything using credit cards, rather than direct debits which are so popular in the UK.
Perhaps also enterprising individuals combined multiple darknet credential and financial data dumps into a whole and went to town.
About the credit versus debit card ... My debit card is safer than my credit card. Any interaction that does not involve chip+pin requires TFA where I need to enter a transaction code generated by a TAN generator. And if a seller escalates to lower safety (chip + signature), the joke is on them in terms of fraud liability.
Now who do we know, who could that be, that keep tracking our device's location pretty much constantly and keeps location history stored somewhere on some servers? Hmmm? And why, in the everloving fuck, would someone else be able to get that data?...spoofed GPS locations the device was known to use
[The attackers were also able to bypass multi-factor authentication by accessing SMS messages.]
How many times does this have to happen for multi-factor authentication to no longer use SMS?
It is *really* hard to get the message across that SMS is not adequate for 2FA at this risk level. Many, many banks only support SMS for 2FA, and won't let you use U2F, Yubikey, RSA token, etc. at all.More robust security is of course nice, but it certainly sounds like they accessed those SMS messages on the device itself; i.e. the insecurity was due to the devices and how they deal with SMS, not the protocol itself (which is what people usually complain about when they complain about SMS insecurity). It's conceivable that app permissions could be improved here to reduce this risk, e.g. by forbidding permanent access to incoming SMS messages (or at least treating that very differently), and typically requiring each app to request permission each time it wants to read an incoming SMS. Other 2fa implementations can also have vulnerabilities once your device is hacked, even if they use more secure protocols.[The attackers were also able to bypass multi-factor authentication by accessing SMS messages.]
How many times does this have to happen for multi-factor authentication to no longer use SMS?
Not that a better approach wouldn't be nice, but it's still worthwhile to protect what's easily available too.
On paper, yeah.What happens to the people's accounts in cases like this? Knowing capitalism and banks, I'm guessing the consumer is yet again expected to bootstrap themselves out of losing their life savings, I assume.
It really depends ... on paper the bank must refund fraudulent transactions within very few days. No questions asked. But reality can shatter upon impact with the burden of proof.
Fortunately, most banks are absolutely on top of things and will proactively refund stuff and they will usually refund first and ask questions later.
Its all moot anyway.It is *really* hard to get the message across that SMS is not adequate for 2FA at this risk level. Many, many banks only support SMS for 2FA, and won't let you use U2F, Yubikey, RSA token, etc. at all.More robust security is of course nice, but it certainly sounds like they accessed those SMS messages on the device itself; i.e. the insecurity was due to the devices and how they deal with SMS, not the protocol itself (which is what people usually complain about when they complain about SMS insecurity). It's conceivable that app permissions could be improved here to reduce this risk, e.g. by forbidding permanent access to incoming SMS messages (or at least treating that very differently), and typically requiring each app to request permission each time it wants to read an incoming SMS. Other 2fa implementations can also have vulnerabilities once your device is hacked, even if they use more secure protocols.[The attackers were also able to bypass multi-factor authentication by accessing SMS messages.]
How many times does this have to happen for multi-factor authentication to no longer use SMS?
Not that a better approach wouldn't be nice, but it's still worthwhile to protect what's easily available too.
I've tried several times to get my bank's IT team to issue a bug ticket for this. I have not found any way to explain it to a Level 1 customer support rep that doesn't result in them just saying "well, I trust our internal IT, so you must be wrong".
At least my contract with them says it's 100% their fault if the online banking gets hacked and money goes missing.
Dear FBI. This is why we need strong encryption for everyone. With strong encryption and actual (non SMS) 2FA, this type of attack is mitigated.
Start that out with 'Dear Congress'
Its all moot anyway.It is *really* hard to get the message across that SMS is not adequate for 2FA at this risk level. Many, many banks only support SMS for 2FA, and won't let you use U2F, Yubikey, RSA token, etc. at all.More robust security is of course nice, but it certainly sounds like they accessed those SMS messages on the device itself; i.e. the insecurity was due to the devices and how they deal with SMS, not the protocol itself (which is what people usually complain about when they complain about SMS insecurity). It's conceivable that app permissions could be improved here to reduce this risk, e.g. by forbidding permanent access to incoming SMS messages (or at least treating that very differently), and typically requiring each app to request permission each time it wants to read an incoming SMS. Other 2fa implementations can also have vulnerabilities once your device is hacked, even if they use more secure protocols.[The attackers were also able to bypass multi-factor authentication by accessing SMS messages.]
How many times does this have to happen for multi-factor authentication to no longer use SMS?
Not that a better approach wouldn't be nice, but it's still worthwhile to protect what's easily available too.
I've tried several times to get my bank's IT team to issue a bug ticket for this. I have not found any way to explain it to a Level 1 customer support rep that doesn't result in them just saying "well, I trust our internal IT, so you must be wrong".
At least my contract with them says it's 100% their fault if the online banking gets hacked and money goes missing.
I learned when 2FA malfunctioned (I wasn't getting the texts and calls) that I could just call the bank customer support and tell them "I'm locked out, I can't get the codes, please help me" and they just verified my last-4 social, name, address, and gave me a bypass code to get in.
There has to be a back door like that when people get locked out (lose their phone/token/whatever) so it doesn't matter.
Actually i think that from 2021 strong auth for banks in eu is mandatory
I’m being s bit thick, I’m afraid; where are they sending the money? And why can’t that be traced?
all these "tech" geniuses on a "tech" site yet none figured out you how to use prepaid credit cards to shop online and use only a siloed device at home for banking, credit card accounts, important..... accounts?
Yall seriously have banking/credit/debit card apps on your phones, log into banks and pay bills on your phone in your name in 2005 I mean 2020? hahahahahaha
wow just wow got my 1st cell phone in 1994 in high school and that was john smith. Same with internet utilities, just make up some numbers pay the deposit trust me all these "companies" want is your money
You actually mean your cell phone, internet, cable, and utilities are in your real name hahahahahaha
hint
buy a cheap notebook or cell phone or 1 of the dozens of old ones most people have by now
dont use it for anything but your bank credit cards and never connect it to any network outside your home, when done, power it off, pop out battery, store wherever NEVER use it for anything else
I mean all youre doing is paying a bill or checking balance I dont quite understand why people need this ability 24/7 everywhere they go?
separate devices
1 for $$$$$ this never leaves home base
1 for personal friends family etc
1 for fun, downloading, porno, or whatever youre into....
never the 3 shall meet
the internet, apps, microsoft, apple, google, facebook, etc are what we called spyware/malware/viruses/stalker ware about 15 years ago, people were paid good money to remove such crapware from peoples devices way back then now it's a feature, all their "products" are so bloated with stalker ware it's laughable they do not care about you or your privacy they're basically "private" fronts for the government and various alphabet boys who care nothing about you or your privacy.
prepaid credit cards are basically burner bank accounts no block chain needed its been the hoods bitcoin for almost 20 years geez & you can actually buy gas and cheeseburgers with em in the real world
Not looking to troll, but none of the spoofed signatures contain iPhone-related names. That's not to say they weren't there, but I wonder about the coincidence.
For instance, the ability to know the GPC locations of victims - this data is not easy to obtain, unless a device is laced with malware through a malicious app. I think it's also universally accepted (and has been reported many times) that Google's Play store doesn't;t have the same levels of malware protection
So malware-laced apps downloaded from the Play store create a profile on their users, which then are matched against bank data that has already been obtained elsewhere to complete the metadata signature that's then utilised in the attack to bypass bank's protections and 2FAs?
Another reason to pay for everything using credit cards, rather than direct debits which are so popular in the UK.
Perhaps also enterprising individuals combined multiple darknet credential and financial data dumps into a whole and went to town.
About the credit versus debit card ... My debit card is safer than my credit card. Any interaction that does not involve chip+pin requires TFA where I need to enter a transaction code generated by a TAN generator. And if a seller escalates to lower safety (chip + signature), the joke is on them in terms of fraud liability.
Maybe that's true abroad, but in the U.S., regular credit card is definitely safer. It's not just the matter of funds being drained, but secondary effects too. For example, one sends their landlord a check and it bounces. Likewise, if one pays a utility bill, card bill, etc electronically and payment is rejected. With a regular credit card, payment goes through or it doesn't. No risk of overdraft fees. While banks will generally refund all overdraft fees, etc in cases of fraud, 3rd parties may not.
In short, paying with bank debit card, it's your money on the line while paying with regular credit card, it's their money on the line. Also, banks tend to be slow to return funds.
So much focus on emulators, before the article casually gets around to mentioning the attackers already had the bank and SMS credentials.